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Departing from the mainstream literature on European monetary integration, we acknowledge the 
interdependence of economic sentiment synchronization and business cycle co-movements for 17 
individual European countries and the euro area (EA). Building upon both hard and soft data, we find 
that sentiment cycles are in fact the driving force behind general economic cycle synchronization. This 
finding is robust with respect to different synchronization indicators, different Granger causality test 
specifications, data frequencies (monthly vs. quarterly), and the targeted EA composition (EA11 vs. 
EA19). The latter is of particular importance, implying that recent EA enlargements have not decreased 
its homogeneity in this regard. Our results exhibit a certain degree of dependence upon the business 
cycle phase. The synchronization of 17 examined countries vis-a-vis the EA seems to be even more 
intensive in recessions than in expansions. In other words, common monetary policy of the ECB should 
be able to effectively act as a countercyclical tool when an individual national economy is facing a 
recession. 
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1. Introduction 
The intensification of euro integration process has triggered a proliferation of empirical studies dealing 
with business cycle synchronization between peripheral EU countries and the euro area. The motivation 
for that type of research stems from the literature on optimum currency areas. The concept of optimum 
currency area (OCA) was introduced by Mundell (1961), and has been thoroughly examined by a 
tremendously large number of studies (see e.g. Mongelli (2005) or Afonso and Furceri (2008) among 
many Europe-centered authors). Namely, an economy joining the euro area (EA) should give up its 
monetary sovereignty and the possibility of using autonomous stabilization policies. In that sense, a 
strong level of uniformity between the business cycles of the joining country and the EA itself is a 
necessary condition for the efficiency of the Economic and Monetary Union. Asymmetric and 
asynchronous business cycles would not only undermine the success of the common currency, but 
would, according to Bergman (2006), bring into question its very survival.  
In that research field, two specific literature strands have emerged. The first one deals with business 
cycle synchronization of European economies (Darvas and Szapáry, 2008; Furceri and Karras, 2008; 
Savva, Neanidis and Osborn, 2010; Aguiar-Conraria and Soares, 2011; Lee, 2013; Lehwald, 2013; 
Degiannakis, Duffy and Filis; 2014; Belke, Domnick and Gros, 2017). The other one is focused on the 
synchronization of economic sentiment cycles among European economies. Apart from some rare 
studies such as Aguiar-Conraria, Martins and Soares (2013) or Thomakos and Papailias (2014), not 
much has been said about this topic.  
The reason behind this is that conventional indicators of economic sentiment tend to closely mimic the 
behavior of aggregate economic activity in terms of not only GDP (Gelper and Croux, 2010; Sorić, Lolić 
and Čižmešija, 2016; Claveria, Monte and Torra, 2020), but of a variety of macroeconomic variables 
(Claveria, Pons and Ramos, 2007; Sorić, Škrabić and Čižmešija, 2013; Lehmann, 2020). In that sense, 
it would be expected that the cycles of economic sentiment share a common pattern with business cycles 
in general. However, is that really so?  
Through this paper, we aim to establish a platform for the interaction of these two literature strands. As 
Hohnisch and Westerhoff (2008) point out, if economic sentiment indeed foreshadows actual economic 
activity in a Keynesian manner, business cycle synchronization among European economies might 
potentially be a mere byproduct of synchronicity among the cycles of their economic sentiment. 
Causality may also be governed from the opposite direction, and the two concepts may even be mutually 
independent or intertwined. In a broader sense, this paper empirically contributes to the academic debate 
on the signal extraction problem (Lucas, 1973) in the context of business cycles. 
We add to the literature in several aspects. We perform a meticulous analysis of economic cycles’ 
synchronization for 17 European economies. In more detail, we examine eight recent acquisitions to the 
EA (countries that have joined the EA after its first enlargement in 1999, i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), as well as nine economies that have not yet 
adopted the common currency: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK). Relying on a rich dataset of European Business and Consumer 
Surveys (BCS), for each country we extract the cycles of two separate economic sentiment indicators: 
Industrial Confidence Indicator (in a monthly setting) and the Economic Sentiment Indicator, capturing 
the economy as a whole (in a quarterly setting). Further on, we quantify the synchronization degree 
between these cycles in individual EU member states and the EA. In an analogous manner, we perform 
the same empirical analysis for the cycles of the corresponding macroeconomic reference variables: 
industrial production and GDP (respectively). Having at hand the coherent time series of 
synchronization measures for BCS indicators and macroeconomic variables, several specifications of 
Granger causality tests are applied to scrutinize the causality direction between the two cycles. Our 
results strongly direct the arrow of causality from sentiment synchronization to the synchronization of 
business cycles per se, once again attaching considerable weight to the concept of animal spirits and 
their relevance in driving the economy as a whole. Throughout such a wide-scope analysis, we basically 
build upon the research directions given by Campos, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2019) in their meticulous 
meta-analysis of studies related to business cycle synchronization in the euro integration context. 
Namely, Campos, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2019) suggest that future studies on this topic should consider 
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the dynamics of different groupings of countries (e.g. core EA vs. the periphery, EA vs. candidate 
countries, or peggers vs. floaters when it comes to European economies outside the EA) and shed light 
on the impact of euro introduction on the assessed synchronization. Particular emphasis should be made 
on the robustness of econometric results by considering alternative synchronization measures and 
different targeted macroeconomic variables. And we aim to contribute in these particular aspects. Our 
calculations show that countries outside the EA are relatively strongly synchronized with the EA, 
regardless of the chosen EA composition (EA11 or EA19). The strength of synchronization seems to be 
robustly increasing over time, except for Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece, which have all been severely 
hit by the global financial crisis. Finally, opposing conventional wisdom, countries with a floating 
exchange rate regime seem exhibit a higher level of synchronization with the EA in comparison to fixed 
exchange rate regimes.  
The remainder of the paper is conceptualized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical 
literature on business cycle and sentiment cycle synchronization in the EU. Section 3 explains the 
specificities of the utilized dataset and methodological framework, while Section 4 presents the obtained 
empirical results. We conclude by discussing the main takeaways and policy implications of our results, 
and provide directions for future research.   
2. Literature review 
As presented by Mongelli (2005), similarity of shocks and policy responses to these shocks is a 
fundamental OCA prerequisite that encompasses most of the other OCA features. If the strength and 
duration of economic shocks among countries that form a monetary union highly resemble each other, 
those countries face low costs of the common monetary policy and do form an optimal monetary area.  
An extremely vibrant discussion is being held on the adequate level of synchronization of business 
cycles in the EA (Aguiar-Conraria and Soares, 2011; Konstantakopoulou and Tsionas, 2011; Lee, 2013), 
including also the potential enlargement of the EA (Savva, Neanidis, and Osborn, 2010).  
Another strand of literature focuses on the simultaneity of economic sentiment cycles in the EA member 
states (Hohnisch and Westerhoff, 2008; Thomakos and Papailias, 2014; Aguiar-Conraria, Martins, and 
Soares, 2013). The main question that remains open is what is the causality direction between the 
synchronization of business cycles and economic sentiment cycles. This paper aims to fill that literature 
gap.  
The third literature strand examines whether economic synchronization is time-varying and dependent 
on the current state of the business cycle (Degiannakis, Duffy, and Filis, 2014). This section will briefly 
review the main takeaways from all three literature strands. 
Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011) use wavelet analysis for 15 countries that first joined the EU (EU-
15). Although Denmark decided not to join the monetary union, its economy is highly synchronized 
with the EA. On the other hand, periphery countries such as Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Finland do 
not share a common business cycle with the rest of EU-15. Cyprus and Slovakia adopted the Euro 
recently, but their business cycles are not in line with the rest of EU-15.  
Lehwald (2013) investigates the co-movement of output, investment, and consumption growth using a 
Bayesian dynamic factor model for the pre-Euro period (1991-1998) and Euro period (2000-2010), 
decomposing macroeconomic fluctuations into three factors: Euro factor, country factor, and the 
idiosyncratic one. Lehwald (2013) shows a strong co-movement in the observed macroeconomic 
variables for most EA countries in the pre-Euro period. After 1999, the core EA group records increasing 
synchronization due to a worldwide development of increased business cycle synchronization, while it 
has decreased for most peripheral countries. Therefore, there are noticeable imbalances between core 
and peripheral EA countries after the introduction of Euro. Lee (2013) shows that due to a strong 
regional effect in the pre-EMU period (1985-1998), business cycles were getting more homogeneous in 
most countries, while after that, the business cycles diverged.  
Konstantakopoulou and Tsionas (2011) use different filtering methods to extract the cyclical component 
of output, and observe cross-correlations, and dynamic relationships using the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. The authors conclude that the core countries (Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria) are the most synchronized, and form a common European cycle. 
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No synchronization with the rest of European countries is found for Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg and 
Finland. Belke, Domnick, and Gros (2017) conclude that business cycles are not synchronized in the 
EA, most notably within periphery countries. A decline in the synchronization of core and peripheral 
business cycles is recorded after the economic crisis (2008Q1-2015Q4) compared to the pre-crisis period 
(1999Q1-2007Q4). Frenkel and Nickel show incompatibility in supply and demand shocks and their 
adjustment dynamics in the EA, and Central and Eastern European countries. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Furceri and Karras (2008) find a noticeable increase of cyclical 
synchronization after the introduction of Euro (1999 to 2004) for 12 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom). The net exports component of GDP provides the strongest evidence of synchronization in 
the post-EMU period (Furceri and Karras, 2008). An intensification of synchronization in GDP and its 
components within EMU countries is also shown in Darvas and Szapáry (2008). Savva, Neanidis, and 
Osborn (2010) consider business cycle synchronization of industrial production for the period of January 
1980 to June 2006 via a bivariate VAR-GARCH model. There is a significant increase in business cycle 
synchronization in new EU member states, core and periphery countries, and also countries in the 
negotiation status (Savva, Neanidis, and Osborn, 2010).  
It is important to note that the above cited evidence of increasing business cycle synchronization after 
the introduction of Euro does not consider the period of the recent economic crisis. Crisis periods are 
challenging for the overall business cycles harmonization of EA economies. Due to the global financial 
crisis followed by the sovereign debt crisis, some EA countries have recorded desynchronized business 
cycles with the rest of EA. Noteworthy, peripheral countries as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain, 
and non-EA countries like United Kingdom and Sweden have shown decreasing business cycle 
synchronization in the crisis period (Degiannakis, Duffy, and Filis, 2014). Also, Lee (2013) questions 
the adequacy of a common monetary policy and finds desynchronization effects after the sovereign debt 
crisis for Greece and Portugal. Similar findings of divergent behavior of business cycles between the 
core and periphery, and also within the periphery, are shown in Belke, Domnick, and Gros (2017). Belke, 
Domnick, and Gros (2017) point out that it should be investigated why business cycles desynchronized. 
One potentially important phenomenon that might answer this question could be the economic 
sentiment. 
Hohnisch and Westerhoff (2008) indicate that testing economic sentiment synchronization would add 
valuable information to the business cycle synchronization itself. Economic sentiment indicator (ESI) 
is a monthly indicator of the prevailing business and consumer sentiment that mimics the movement of 
GDP. Thomakos and Papailias (2014) point out that it is preferred to concentrate on ESI instead of hard 
macroeconomic data (output) as the sentiment indicator is forward-looking, and available on monthly 
basis for a long historical period. Aguiar-Conraria, Martins, and Soares (2013) use wavelet analysis to 
study the synchronization of economic cycles via ESI as a proxy variable for real GDP growth rate. 
They find that economic sentiment cycles are more synchronized after 1999 in EA-10 countries and 
Denmark, while in the case of United Kingdom these conclusions are not valid. Overall, there is higher 
similarity and synchronization of ESI after the introduction of EMU (Aguiar-Conraria, Martins, and 
Soares, 2013). Thomakos and Papailias (2014) conclude that ESI movements after the recent economic 
crisis exhibit a breakdown in synchronization in many European countries, the effect being particularly 
intensive in Greece.  
Finally, one important question arises: Does the synchronization of business sentiment cause business 
cycle synchronization, or does causality go in the opposite direction? (Hohnisch and Westerhoff, 2008: 
258). This paper aims to find an answer to that question by assessing the synchronization of economic 
sentiment cycles (via ESI and the ICI) and macroeconomic business cycles (via GDP and industrial 
production). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
This section briefly explains the utilized dataset and methodological issues of measuring business cycle 
synchronization. 
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3.1. Data 
We examine two separate datasets: soft data (survey-based, depicting economic sentiment) and hard 
data (macroeconomic variables, depicting the state of an economy). The first one refers to the European 
Commission’s BCS data. More specifically, we assess two composite BCS indicators: ICI and ESI. 
These indicators measure managers’ and consumers’ attitudes about the prevailing economic climate in 
their micro and macro surroundings, as well as their expectations of future trajectories of relevant 
economic variables. BCS questions are formulated in a qualitative manner, where a respondent simply 
declares that a particular variable is/will be: better/the same/worse in the past/following several months. 
These responses are conventionally quantified in the form of response balances, i.e. differences between 
the proportions of positive and negative responses to a particular question.  Afterwards, response 
balances of the most relevant questions from an individual sector are averaged to obtain a sector-specific 
composite BCS indicator. To be concrete, ICI is obtained as an arithmetic average of response balances 
of questions on current order books, production expectations, and stocks of finished products (with an 
inverted sign). ESI is an economy-wide indicator, obtained as a weighted average of ICI and the 
corresponding sectoral BCS composite indicators in services, consumer sector, construction, and retail 
trade. The following weights are used for the sector-specific indicators: industry (40%), services (30%), 
consumers (20%), construction (5%), and retail trade (5%), aiming to adequately capture the structure 
of the European economy.   
Each of two elaborated indicators is designed to track a specific macroeconomic reference variable. ICI 
is conceptualized to foreshadow industrial production (IND hereinafter), while ESI should mimic the 
behavior of the economy as a whole, represented by GDP (European Commission, 2016). These 
macroeconomic variables constitute the second examined dataset, obtained from Eurostat. All examined 
variables are given in index form (2015=100) and are seasonally adjusted using the ARIMA X12 
method.  
Each mentioned variable is assessed for each of the 27 EU Member States, plus the United Kingdom. 
The time spans of monthly variables (IND and ESI) is at most 2000 M01 to 2020 M06, while quarterly 
variables (GDP and ESI) span at most from 1995 Q1 to 2020 Q2, depending on data availability in 
individual countries. 
3.2. Measuring synchronization  
Measuring coherence of two cycles is not a simple problem. Practitioners mostly use the correlation 
coefficient (e.g., Flood and Rose, 2010), but scientific literature often considers alternative angles (e.g. 
Mink et al., 2012). A problem often arises with highly synchronized cycles that are not confirmed with 
strong synchronization indicators, or vice versa. This finding raises a question of indicators’ adequacy 
and suggests a need for more in-depth insight into the problem of business cycle synchronization. In 
line with that, we explore three different measures of cycle coherence. 
We analyze the synchronization of a country’s economic cycle 𝑐(𝑡) with regard to a pool of countries 
𝑐𝑟(𝑡), 𝑟 ∈ {1,2, … 𝑛}. We define the cycle of an aggregate 𝑐∗(𝑡) (EA19 or EA11) as a weighted average 
of individual cycles 𝑐𝑟(𝑡) with weights equal to the country’s share in the total (for the corresponding 
variable).  
Moving window correlation. The most widely utilized synchronization measure is the moving window 
(Pearson’s) correlation coefficient. It is calculated as a correlation coefficient of 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑐∗(𝑡) on 𝑘 
(moving) data points: 
𝜌(𝑡) =
∑ (𝑐(𝑠) − 𝑐̅)(𝑐∗(𝑠) − 𝑐∗̅)
𝑡
𝑠=𝑡−𝑘+1
√∑ (𝑐𝑖(𝑠) − 𝑐?̅?)
2𝑡
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where k is the window size and 𝑐 ̅and 𝑐∗̅ are corresponding averages. Values of 𝜌(𝑡) are between −1 
and 1, indicating positive/negative and strong/weak synchronization in time-point 𝑡. 
Cycles can also differ in economic phases (recession vs. expansion) and amplitudes, so we explore two 
additional coherence measures. 
(Phase) synchronicity. This measure focuses on coherence in phases (expansion vs. recession) and 
neglects the amplitude level. The base is elementary, just a binary indicator depicting if the examined 
output gaps have the same sign or not. For every country 𝑐(𝑡), we define coherence with the r-th country 








where 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑐𝑟(𝑡) are the output gaps of interest. The total (phase) synchronicity is equal to a 
weighted average of single country phase synchronicities: 





where 𝑤𝑟 ≥ 0 and the sum of weights is equal to one. Total phase synchronization is also defined 
between −1 and 1. If 𝜙(𝑡) = 1 then the output gap 𝑐(𝑡) is in the same economic phase as all n countries, 
and if 𝜙(𝑡) = −1 then the output gap 𝑐(𝑡) is in different economic phase from all n countries (the latter 
being in the same phase).  
Similarity. This measure focuses on the amplitudes of cycles. Economic phenomena that have precisely 
the same phases have 𝜙(𝑡) = 1 (implying strong synchronization of cycles), but they may considerably 
differ in terms of amplitudes. This measure takes that into account. We define similarity as the ratio of 










and the total similarity is  
𝛾(𝑡) = 1 −








The similarity indicator equals one if the examined output gaps have the exact same amplitude.1 
3.3. Causality testing 
An initial screening of the assessed time series has revealed a mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables.2 Because 
of that, we opted for the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach that allows for both stationary and 
nonstationary data. To be specific, we examine the intertemporal dynamics between the observed 
variables via a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the following form:  
𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜
𝑡
























                                                                        
1 See e.g. Kotarac, Kunovac and Ravnik (2017) for a detailed discussion about the three utilized cycle coherence measures. 
2 The full set of results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is left out here for the sake of brevity, but can be obtained from 
the authors upon reasonable request. 
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where 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 represents a measure of business cycle synchronization between the observed 
country and EA (EA11 or EA19), and 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the corresponding measure of sentiment cycle 
synchronization. The chosen lag order (on the basis of Akaike information criterion in this specific case) 
is denoted by 𝑝, 𝑑 is the highest observed integration order of the observed time series, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are 
constant terms, 𝛽𝑠 and 𝛾𝑠 are autoregressive parameters, while 𝜀1𝑡 and 𝜀2𝑡 are white-noise (mutually 
uncorrelated) processes. Examining the existence of Granger causality within the Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) procedure implies testing the following null hypotheses:    
𝐻0: 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 does not Granger cause 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜  if 𝛾1,1 = 𝛾1,2 = ⋯ = 𝛾1,𝑝 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 does not Granger cause 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 if 𝛾2,1 = 𝛾2,2 = ⋯ = 𝛾2,𝑝 = 0. 
(7) 
It should be highlighted that the hypotheses at hand are tested only on the first 𝑝 lags of the variables at 
hand. The additional 𝑑 lags enter the model only to ensure the asymptotic χ2 distribution of the Wald 
test statistic. 
As a robustness check, we also consider the standard Granger causality framework, designed strictly for 
stationary time series. This means that we re-estimate model (1) using levels of stationary variables, and 
first-differences of I(1) ones. Also, the model specification includes only 𝑝 instead of 𝑝 + 𝑑 lags of all 
endogenous variables, and the null hypotheses of non-causality remain exactly as presented in equation 
(2).  
 
4. Empirical results 
As the initial input for our empirical analysis, we use the conventional Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter 
to extract the cyclical components of all four analyzed time series (IND, ICI, GDP, and ESI) for each of 
the 28 assessed countries. 
Further on, we calculate the three proposed cycle coherence measures (as presented in section 3.2) 
between each individual country and the EA11 aggregate. It should be noted that 𝜙(𝑡) and  𝛾(𝑡) were 
proven to be extremely volatile, so we utilized an MA(12) smoother to calm the variance of these series. 
The three calculated coherence measures for GDP and ESI (quarterly setting) are depicted in Figure 1 
for EA economies at hand. The same time series for non-EA economies are depicted in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix.3 On average, both EA and non-EA economies seem to be rather closely tied to the 
Eurosystem core. Out of the three coherence measures, the only one exhibiting rather bad results is cycle 
similarity (𝛾(𝑡)), generating negative values in the most part of the examined time period.  
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of synchronization measures for non-core EA countries  
  
                                                                        
3 The corresponding results for the monthly setting (IND and ICI) are not shown for the sake of brevity, but they resemble 
those presented here to a great extent. 











Note: Vertical line depicts EA entry 
 
A secularly positive trend can be noticed in the synchronization intensity depicted in Figures 1 and A1 
(Appendix). This is in line with a meta-analysis provided by Campos, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2019), 
who find that the business cycle correlation coefficients for European economies have increased over 
time from an average of 0.4 in the 1990s to 0.6 after the formation of the EA. However, a more careful 
examination is needed to ascertain to what extent is the established dynamics dependent on the business 
cycle and extreme events such as the global financial crisis, or the introduction of common currency in 
individual countries.  
In July 2020, Bulgaria and Croatia have entered the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). Let 
us consider a hypothetical situation in which these countries eventually satisfy the Maastricht 
convergence criteria and choose to join the EA. The EA then faces a harsh recession, and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) lowers key interest rates. Once the economic outlook stabilizes, ECB starts to 
slowly adapt to these new circumstances and adjusts the interest rates upwards to preserve price stability. 
If such a situation finds Bulgaria or Croatia in a state of prolonged recession, ECB’s interest rates 
increase would in fact act cyclically, prolong the recession, and have detrimental effects on these two 
economies.4 This type of a hypothetical scenario can easily be generalized to any of the 17 assessed 
countries (16 EU economies outside the EA, plus the United Kingdom) should it become a member of 
the Economic and Monetary Union at some point. Because of that, it is crucial to examine whether the 
economic cycles of individual EU countries and the EA aggregate indeed are coherent both in periods 
of expansions and recessions. A glance at Figures 1 and 2 reveals that three out of four examined 
indicators indeed adjust upwards in the dawn of the global financial crisis. 
To examine this issue more closely, we use the Bry-Boschan algorithm (via R package BCDating) to 
date the turning points of each of the 17 non-EA economies, and calculate the three examined coherence 
indicators with respect to EA11. The obtained results for GDP are summarized in Table 1, while Table 
2 presents the corresponding results for ESI. 
Table 1 reveals that e.g. the Bulgarian economy is more synchronized with EA11 in expansions than in 
recession, as indicated by three out of three assessed coherence measures. On the other hand, the 
                                                                        
4 An opposite scenario (an individual EU country recording positive growth when, at the same, the EA is in recession) seems 
less plausible. Even in the case of United Kingdom, its impact on the aggregate EU economy is rather limited (Sampson, 2017). 
The same holds for the EA. For example, Peersman (2010) finds that UK economic shocks are more relevant for the US than 
the EA itself in the long run.     
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Croatian economy seems to exhibit exactly the opposite characteristics. Which of the two effects does 
then prevail?  
To answer that question, we average the obtained coherence measures across countries and present the 
obtained results in the bottom right corner of Table 1. We find no particular asymmetries in the observed 
relationship. Two coherence indicators point to a stronger relationship in recessions, while 𝛾(𝑡) suggest 
that synchronization is more intensive in expansions. However, Table 2 suggests that economic 
sentiment behaves much more asymmetrically, i.e. three out of three indicators suggest that ESI is more 
closely related to the aggregate EA11 sentiment in recessionary periods than in expansions. This notion 
is in line with recent behavioral literature, finding that e.g. stock markets (Tsai, 2014; 2017) and housing 
markets (Zheng and Osmer, 2019) react to various sentiment measures more intensely during major 
market disruptions. Our results can also generally be related to the concept of a psychologically-driven 
business cycle (Sorić, 2018). Also, we bring our findings in relation to Degiannakis, Duffy, and Filis 
(2014) and Lee (2013), who find evidence of desynchronization for peripheral countries amidst the 
global financial crisis. Figures 1 and A1 in fact corroborate that for the majority of analyzed countries, 
but Tables 1 and 2 reveal that, on average (taking all documented recessions into account, not only the 
global financial crisis), synchronization does not weaken in busts. 
We repeat the same analysis for the case of IND and ICI, and show the results in the Appendix (Tables 
A1 and A2). The findings seem rather robust. ICI is again more synchronized in recessions than 
expansion, while this time the same is valid also for IND.5 These results clearly indicate that the 
hypothetical scenario of a common monetary policy acting procyclicaly in some members of the EA in 
recessions does not seem plausible. A possible reason behind this inference is the well-established notion 
that intensive trade and financial flows tend to induce more synchronized economic cycles (Artis, 
Fidrmuc, and Scharler, 2008; Furceri and Karras, 2008). A mismatch in phase synchronicity between 
Euro adopting countries and the EA core is unlikely, given that the coherence of examined cycles even 
magnifies during recessions in most of our specifications. Therefore, our results can be interpreted as an 
argument in favor of EA enlargement. They can also be brought in relation to Antonakakis (2012), who 
finds that recessions tend to positively affect business cycle coherence after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system. Even more important, Antonakakis (2012) finds that the 2008 recession has 
witnessed an unprecedented level of business cycle co-movements. It should also be noted that our 
results contradict those of Thomakos and Papailias (2014), who find that European ESI is “out of sync”. 
The differences in obtained results may be to some extent explained by different methodological grounds 
of these two studies.  
Second, our sample comprises eight new EA member states (Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia). It seems reasonable to scrutinize the effect of EA membership on the 
strength of synchronization between these economies and the monetary union itself. Figures 1 and A1, 
at least at first sight, point to the conclusion that a common monetary policy has indeed deepened the 
integration of observed economies. Let us quantify that notion. Table 3 presents the average values of 
three examined synchronization indicators for the pre-EA and EA periods. The break between these two 
periods is set to the date of EA accession, i.e. the start of: 2001 (Greece), 2007 (Slovenia), 2008 (Cyprus 
and Malta), 2009 (Slovakia), 2011 (Estonia), 2014 (Latvia), and 2015 (Lithuania). In essence, Table 3 
reveals that almost all examined countries exhibit an intensification of synchronization after EA 
accession, regardless of the chosen coherence measure. This inference has three major   exceptions in 
the assessed sample of countries: Greece, Latvia, and Lithuania. Interesting enough, all three of them 
exhibit some very similar economic patterns. They were among the economies that were hit the hardest 
by the global financial crisis (Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv, 2011; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia, 
2013; Staehr, 2013;). All three of them responded to the crisis by embracing severe austerity measures, 
while Greece and Latvia even asked the International Monetary Fund for an emergency bailout loan. 
Also noteworthy, Greece was a member of the EA in the inception of crisis, while the Baltic countries 
had a currency peg to the euro. In other words, Greece did not have the chance to use autonomous 
                                                                        
5 We repeated this entire analysis for the EA19 composition, and the main results have remained intact. Business cycles and 
sentiment cycles of examined countries are slightly more synchronized in recessions.     
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monetary policy and currency devaluation as a tool to combat the recession, while the Baltic states chose 
not use it to fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria and enter the EA as soon as possible. In such 
circumstances, all three countries performed an internal devaluation, i.e. public sector lay-offs and 
significant government spending cuts. These policy measures prompted a relatively quick economic 
rebound in the Baltic countries (with immense reductions in welfare and general well-being), and an 
extremely long-lived and painful recession in the Greek case. Amid these circumstances, the economic 
trajectories of the three assessed countries and the EA have obviously diverged to some extent. 
It is interesting to notice that Kregždė (2020) finds a very similar weakening of linkages between the 
Baltic economies and the EA in the years following the European debt crisis.   Kregždė (2020) interprets 
such a result by the fact that the global financial crisis had an abrupt and sharp impact on these 
economies6, yet their recovery cycles are somewhat different in comparison to the EA. As a 
consequence, snychronization of cycles during the recovery period is obviously weaker than before.  
Having seen that the three above elaborated economies with a currency peg exhibit less synchronization 
with the EA in recessions, it seemed  reasonable to scrutinize if there exists some kind of a regularity in 
the effect of exchange rate regime on the intensity of synchronization with the EA. This type of research 
usually views the fixed exchange rate regime as favorable for intensifying trade (Dorn and Egger, 2015), 
which should then ultimately stimulate snychronyzation among the trading partners. Further on, the 
Mundell-Fleming model ascertains that, given free capital movement, the monetary policy of a country 
with a fixed exchnage rate regime should converge to the monetary policy of the anchor country 
(Fleming, 1962; Mundel, 1963). Conventional wisdom postulates that monetary policy is then expected 
to induce further business cycle synchronization.  
To shed some light on that issue, we seggregated our sample into two groups of countries: peggers and 
floaters. We follow the approach of Deskar-Škrbić, Kotarac and Kunovac (2020), and define the group 
of peggers as comprised of  Bulgaria, Croatia7, Denmark,  and the  assessed EA members (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, and Greece). The floaters group consists of 
Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We present the average values 
of synchronization measures for the two assessed groups in Table 4. The results are remarkably robust, 
showing that floaters dominate over the peggers in almost all specifications. An interpretation of this 
finding should certaintly include the fact that Sweden and United Kingdom are included in the floaters 
group. Namely, these two economies exhibit remarkable synchronization with the EA (see Tables 1 and 
2). In this regard, Sweden and United Kingdom are obviously so well integrated into the European 
supply chains, as well as in the EA-based trade and financial systems, that this result should come as no 
surprise. It could also be interpreted as one of the many costs incurred by the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the EU (see e.g. Sampson (2017) for a more thorough discussion on the topic). 
                                                                        
6 Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv (2011) even reports that Latvia had a GDP decline of as much as 15% in 2009, 
reportedly the most intensive fall in the world.   
7 Technically, Croatia has a managed float with a tight margin regime, but is often regarded as a quasi-pegger (or a de facto 
pegger) as it successfully maintains the stability of nominal HRK-EUR exchange rate.  
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Table 1. Average cycle coherence for GDP in expansions and recessions with respect to EA11 
Country Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.480 0.296 0.688 0.759 0.688 0.760 0.151 0.478 0.171 0.218 0.284 0.595 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.093 -2.747 0.103 0.311 0.177 -0.018 -1.334 -1.205 -0.557 -1.245 -0.509 -0.356 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.429 0.803 0.868 0.934 0.812 0.747 0.414 0.728 -0.042 0.357 0.184 0.836 
Country Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.496 0.643 0.060 0.763 0.048 0.381 0.298 0.678 0.166 -0.035 0.394 0.810 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.243 -0.724 -1.400 -1.764 -0.979 -1.649 -0.099 -0.019 -0.240 -0.379 -0.002 0.290 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.716 0.714 0.296 0.741 0.115 0.600 0.558 0.648 0.365 0.701 0.633 0.838 
Country Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom OVERALL 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.321 0.108 0.623 0.870 0.274 0.393 0.596 0.826 0.376 0.930 0.360 0.557 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.508 -1.074 0.032 0.198 -0.285 -0.603 0.166 0.314 0.102 0.598 -0.333 -0.593 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.218 0.644 0.755 0.917 0.449 0.822 0.841 0.859 0.586 0.781 0.482 0.745 
Note: Bold entries indicate larger values (expansions (Exp.) vs. recessions (Rec.) for each particular indicator/country) 
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Table 2. Average cycle coherence of ESI in expansions and recessions with respect to EA11 
Country Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Exp. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.125 0.209 0.318 0.452 0.547 0.545 0.156 0.278 0.364 0.187 0.497 0.604 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.377 -1.096 -0.247 0.084 -0.291 0.060 -0.135 0.070 -0.124 -0.253 0.171 0.086 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.186 0.515 0.691 0.825 0.802 0.773 0.438 0.615 0.456 0.605 0.777 0.733 
Country Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.266 0.531 0.065 0.709 0.234 0.574 0.456 0.607 0.344 0.552 0.422 0.618 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.154 -0.108 -0.277 0.121 -0.038 -0.096 -0.065 0.120 -0.091 0.103 -0.050 -0.292 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.663 0.557 0.338 0.637 0.532 0.718 0.635 0.545 0.706 0.729 0.785 0.844 
Country Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom OVERALL 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.118 -0.014 0.531 0.715 0.314 0.541 0.640 0.753 0.473 0.635 0.345 0.500 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.571 -0.961 0.037 0.330 -0.079 -0.433 0.171 0.310 -0.185 0.302 -0.136 -0.097 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.245 0.328 0.820 0.871 0.638 0.722 0.928 0.924 0.735 0.714 0.610 0.686 
Note: Bold entries indicate larger values (expansions (Exp.) vs. recessions (Rec.) for each particular indicator/country) 
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Table 3. EA membership and synchronization strength 
Country  
GDP ESI IP ICI 
Pre-EA EA Pre-EA EA Pre-EA EA Pre-EA EA 
Cyprus 
φ 0.641 0.747 - 0.617 -0.033 0.464 0.378 0.394 
γ 0.373 0.674 -0.005 0.496 -0.036 0.387 0.149 0.340 
ρ -0.083 -0.608 -0.276 -0.084 -0.723 -0.677 -0.080 -0.233 
Estonia 
φ 0.450 0.481 0.156 0.738 0.515 0.287 0.492 0.591 
γ 0.277 0.084 0.061 0.343 0.584 0.171 0.330 0.468 
ρ -1.804 -0.581 -0.264 0.133 0.049 -0.286 -0.069 0.045 
Greece 
φ - 0.166 - 0.534 - 0.242 - 0.490 
γ 0.035 0.223 0.416 0.268 0.350 0.315 0.607 0.250 
ρ -0.168 -0.968 0.083 -0.230 -0.507 -0.310 0.302 -0.342 
Latvia 
φ 0.553 0.109 0.442 0.331 0.511 0.246 0.441 0.472 
γ 0.229 0.071 0.157 0.243 0.389 0.446 0.288 0.521 
ρ -2.062 0.118 -0.329 0.120 -0.025 -0.057 0.086 0.129 
Lithuania 
φ 0.304 -0.131 0.605 0.438 0.223 0.220 0.527 0.304 
γ 0.045 0.239 0.274 0.286 0.165 0.333 0.324 0.352 
ρ -1.400 0.052 -0.104 0.150 -0.495 -0.113 0.024 -0.159 
Malta 
φ 0.037 0.399 - 0.708 0.207 0.246 0.162 0.337 
γ -0.332 0.384 -0.079 0.479 0.179 0.271 0.113 0.216 
ρ -0.387 -0.189 -0.380 0.005 -1.005 -0.640 -0.933 -0.522 
Slovakia 
φ -0.106 0.815 0.283 0.845 0.212 0.531 0.467 0.574 
γ 0.048 0.546 0.188 0.509 0.168 0.801 0.385 0.324 
ρ -0.819 0.202 -0.341 0.107 -0.248 0.218 -0.134 -0.257 
Slovenia 
φ 0.471 0.887 0.673 0.877 0.429 0.642 0.798 0.787 
γ 0.469 0.803 0.449 0.639 0.443 0.646 0.706 0.586 
ρ -0.078 0.158 -0.129 0.236 0.095 0.228 0.390 0.178 
Note: Pre-EA specifications for Cyprus (ESI model), Greece (all models), and Malta (ESI model) were 
not estimated due to data non-availability in that period. 
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ρ γ φ 
monthly EA11 
IP  
peg 0.350 -0.212 0.336 
float 0.543 0.180 0.522 
ICI 
peg 0.497 -0.100 0.381 
float 0.665 0.057 0.520 
monthly EA19  
IP  
peg 0.335 0.056 0.326 
float 0.546 0.262 0.516 
ICI  
peg 0.541 0.007 0.454 
float 0.669 0.077 0.513 
quarterly EA11 
GDP  
peg 0.478 -0.599 0.345 
float 0.638 -0.036 0.467 
ESI  
peg 0.595 -0.129 0.343 
float 0.672 -0.147 0.415 
quarterly EA19 
GDP  
peg 0.564 -0.063 0.495 
float 0.643 0.173 0.460 
ESI  
peg 0.564 -0.063 0.495 
float 0.643 0.173 0.460 
 
In the next step of the analysis, we apply the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach to discern the 
causality direction between sentiment synchronization and general business cycle synchronization. The 
obtained results are summarized in Table 5. As we consider 17 economies, four settings for each country 
(monthly EA11, monthly EA19, quarterly EA11, and quarterly EA19), and three different cycle 
synchronization measures for each of the assessed models, this entails 17 ∙ 4 ∙ 3 = 204 causality test 
specifications. Summarizing the results for such a large number of models is obviously a complex task, 
so we opted for presenting merely the percentages of cases where the null hypothesis of non-causality 
has been rejected for each particular country/specification at the 10% significance level.  
 
For example, let us consider UK as an intriguing case. It is represented by the last row in Table 5. The 
first entry in that row tells us that in 100% of cases (3 out of 3 synchronization measures) the 
synchronization of UK with EA11 in terms of industrial production cycles is Granger-caused by the 
corresponding degree of synchronization in terms of sentiment. On the other hand, causality in the 
opposite direction is not found in any of the three cases in the monthly EA11 specification. Such 
dominance of causality running from sentiment synchronization to economic synchronization 
(sent→econ) in comparison to the econ→sent direction seems rather robust in the UK monthly 
specifications, given that the monthly EA19 specification records similar results (66.67% vs. 0.00%). 
Quarterly assessments (both EA19 and EA11), on the other hand, attach more weight to economy-driven 
sentiment cycles (33.33% vs 66.67%). 
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monthly EA19  quarterly EA11  quarterly EA19  Total 
Total 
 
 Country ICI→ind ind→ICI ICI→ind ind→ICI ESI→GDP GDP→ESI ESI→GDP GDP→ESI  sent→econ  econ→sent 
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 66.67 66.67 33.33 41.67 25.00 
Croatia 66.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 33.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 50.00 16.67 
Cyprus 33.33 33.33   100.00 0.00   66.67 16.67 
Czechia 33.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 33.33 16.67 16.67 
Denmark 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 
Estonia 0.00 66.67   33.33 66.67   16.67 66.67 
Greece 33.33 0.00   66.67 33.33   50.00 16.67 
Hungary 66.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 66.67 0.00 66.67 0.00 66.67 16.67 
Latvia 100.00 33.33   66.67 0.00   83.33 16.67 
Lithuania 33.33 0.00   0.00 66.67   16.67 33.33 
Malta 66.67 0.00   66.67 0.00   66.67 0.00 
Poland 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 50.00 
Romania 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 
Slovenia 33.33 33.33   66.67 0.00   50.00 16.67 
Slovakia 33.33 33.33   33.33 33.33   33.33 33.33 
Sweden 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 33.33 33.33 41.67 
Un. Kingdom 100.00 0.00 66.67 0.00 33.33 66.67 33.33 66.67 58.33 33.33 
Note: Table entries are the percentages of cases the non-causality null hypothesis is rejected for each country/specification.
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A bird’s eye view of Table 5 reveals that the choice of targeted integration level (EA11 vs. EA19) does 
not influence the obtained results practically at all. Literally all examined countries exhibit very similar 
results in EA11 and EA19 specifications. This again indirectly speaks in favor of homogeneity of the 
EA both in its core constellation and its wider composition. 
A glance at the last two columns of Table 5 reveals that, in total, sentiment is found to be the driver of 
general economic cycle synchronization. Taking again UK as an exemplary case (last row of Table 5), 
out of all considered sent→econ specifications, the null hypothesis is rejected in as many as 58.33% of 
cases. On the other hand, the opposite causality direction (econ→sent) is significant in mere 33.33% of 
cases, and this pattern is firmly corroborated in most of the other countries. In total (considering all 
countries and all model specifications), significant sent→econ causality is found in 43.14% of cases, 
while the opposite direction is found to be significant considerably less frequently (26.47% of cases).  
As a robustness check, we also assess the standard Granger causality test, modelling all I(1) variables 
in first differences. The obtained results, as presented in Table 6, are remarkably similar. Again, the 
targeted EA composition does not seem to matter much. Likewise, sent→econ causality is again more 
convincing than the opposite direction of causality (37.25 vs. 29.90% rejections of the null hypothesis), 
although the difference is now less pronounced.   
These conclusions should certainly stimulate both researchers and policymakers to widen their focus 
and include economic sentiment indicators in their analysis of business cycle synchronization within the 
OCA context. Since co-movements of sentiment cycles drive synchronization of economic activity 
cycles, if one is interested in the prerequisites for the efficiency of common monetary policy, the issue 
of primary focus should not be merely the consequence, but the cause as well. 
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monthly EA19  quarterly EA11  quarterly EA19  Total  Total 
 Country ICI→ind ind→ICI ICI→ind ind→ICI ESI→GDP GDP→ESI ESI→GDP GDP→ESI  sent→econ  econ→sent 
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 66.67 66.67 66.67 41.67 33.33 
Croatia 33.33 100.00 33.33 100.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 
Cyprus 33.33 33.33   66.67 33.33   50.00 33.33 
Czechia 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 16.67 25.00 
Denmark 33.33 33.33 66.67 66.67 0.00 33.33 0.00 33.33 25.00 41.67 
Estonia 33.33 33.33   33.33 33.33   33.33 33.33 
Greece 33.33 0.00   33.33 66.67   33.33 33.33 
Hungary 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 33.33 41.67 33.33 
Latvia 66.67 0.00   33.33 33.33   50.00 16.67 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00   0.00 33.33   0.00 16.67 
Malta 33.33 33.33   66.67 0.00   50.00 16.67 
Poland 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 66.67 16.67 41.67 
Romania 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 
Slovenia 33.33 33.33   66.67 0.00   50.00 16.67 
Slovakia 100.00 33.33   33.33 0.00   66.67 16.67 
Sweden 33.33 33.33 0.00 33.33 66.67 66.67 66.67 33.33 41.67 41.67 
Un. Kingdom 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 66.67 66.67 25.00 
 
Note: Table entries are the percentages of cases the non-causality null hypothesis is rejected for each country/specification. 




The literature on European monetary integration mostly focuses on the issue of business cycle 
synchronization as a conditio sine qua non for the validity of OCA theory and the efficiency of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. However, only a few studies insofar have fully acknowledged the 
relevance of economic sentiment synchronization in that respect. We add to this strand of literature by 
modelling the interdependence between economic cycles for 17 European economies (16 EU members 
outside of the EA, plus the United Kingdom) and the EA cycle. Instead of modelling solely their cycles 
of economic activity, we augment the analysis by building upon the rich dataset of European BCS and 
the sentiment indicators that they offer. To be specific, for each of the 17 assessed countries, we inspect 
its synchronization with the EA aggregate in a monthly and quarterly setting. The monthly setting entails 
industrial production and Industrial Confidence Indicator, while the quarterly one comprises GDP and 
the Economic Sentiment Indicator.  
Upon quantifying three coherence measures for each setting (a simple moving correlation coefficient, 
phase synchronicity, and similarity), we find that the intensity of cycle co-movement is somewhat 
dependent on the phase of the business cycle. More precisely, sentiment cycles of individual economies 
are more closely tied to the EA in recession periods. The corresponding results for the cycles of 
economic activity are not that pronounced, but it seems safe to conclude that the intensity of cycle co-
movements does not decrease in recessions. This inference has strong implications for potential EA 
enlargements, suggesting that common monetary policy of the ECB might as well act as a 
countercyclical tool when an individual national economy is facing a recession.   
Further on, we find much more evidence of business cycles being Granger-caused by sentiment cycles 
than the other way around. This finding is robust to the choice of Granger causality test specification, to 
different data frequencies (monthly vs. quarterly), and to the targeted EA composition (EA 11 vs. EA19). 
The latter is of particular importance, indirectly implying that the new EA member states have not 
decreased its homogeneity.  
Opposing conventional wisdom, we find that countries with a floating exchange rate regime are more 
synchronized with the EA than economies with a fixed exchange rate regime. This result is particularly 
driven by Sweden and United Kingdom as bellwethers of synchronization with respect to the EA.  
Among the potentially fruitful directions of future research, it would certainly be interesting to observe 
if sentiment indicators in other economic sectors would produce similar results. For example, there is 
no particular reason why the Consumer Confidence Indicator, or the corresponding indicators for retail 
trade, services, or construction, should co-move with their EA counterpart in the same manner as ICI or 
ESI. Economic sentiment in these sectors might not be relevant for the conduct of common monetary 
policy, but it can certainly add to our understanding of the European Single market and its driving forces. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Average cycle coherence for IND in expansions and recessions with respect to EA11 
Country Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.376 0.502 0.556 0.705 0.158 0.362 0.342 0.551 0.302 0.339 0.387 0.256 
𝛾(𝑡) 0.000 0.187 0.297 0.381 -0.192 -0.063 -0.138 0.031 -0.335 -0.270 0.045 -0.205 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.466 0.607 0.653 0.673 0.124 0.193 0.370 0.482 0.185 0.272 0.288 0.401 
Country Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.121 0.361 0.386 0.471 0.175 0.344 0.476 0.678 0.255 0.224 0.576 0.563 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.852 -0.502 -0.069 0.082 -0.439 -0.172 0.154 0.196 -0.807 -0.709 0.250 0.150 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.256 0.372 0.455 0.319 0.199 0.282 0.533 0.496 0.256 0.218 0.592 0.544 
Country Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom OVERALL 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.360 0.499 0.586 0.595 0.276 0.582 0.500 0.588 0.513 0.601 0.373 0.484 
𝛾(𝑡) 0.001 0.076 0.202 0.205 -0.023 0.022 0.170 0.093 0.328 0.305 -0.083 -0.011 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.410 0.570 0.571 0.630 0.454 0.394 0.494 0.548 0.584 0.590 0.405 0.446 
Note: Bold entries indicate larger values (expansions (Exp.) vs. recessions (Rec.) for each particular indicator/country) 
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Table A2. Average cycle coherence for ICI in expansions and recessions with respect to EA11 
Country Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia 
type Exp. Rec.. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.232 0.454 0.606 0.495 0.555 0.647 0.375 0.461 0.266 0.239 0.431 0.548 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.050 -0.121 0.245 0.157 -0.144 0.198 -0.010 -0.021 -0.207 -0.426 0.042 0.031 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.270 0.533 0.723 0.612 0.676 0.611 0.489 0.727 0.331 0.601 0.628 0.644 
Country Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.208 0.348 0.355 0.375 0.329 0.330 0.510 0.555 0.069 0.310 0.577 0.456 
𝛾(𝑡) -0.147 -0.206 0.131 0.036 0.013 -0.144 0.104 0.035 -0.922 -0.332 0.283 0.149 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.334 0.440 0.361 0.641 0.455 0.455 0.724 0.723 0.435 0.205 0.764 0.746 
Country Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom OVERALL 
Type Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. Exp. Rec. 
𝜙(𝑡) 0.332 0.193 0.605 0.662 0.382 0.287 0.621 0.582 0.575 0.598 0.413 0.444 
𝛾(𝑡) 0.033 -0.136 0.250 0.253 -0.167 -0.352 -0.088 0.056 -0.301 0.013 -0.055 -0.048 
𝜌(𝑡) 0.445 0.218 0.803 0.773 0.439 0.320 0.639 0.714 0.713 0.776 0.543 0.573 
Note: Bold entries indicate larger values (expansions (Exp.) vs. recessions (Rec.) for each particular indicator/countr 
E F Z G  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S                                     2 1 - 0 4  
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